That the various entries of various readers into actual texts is represented as its affirmative moment by such a theory points towards why the work of the reception theorists is only hinted at by Allen Fisher and others. The poets’ notions of readership are actual rather than ideal. When Harwood speaks of leaving an object (the poem) in the room for others to use, or when Roy Fisher similarly talks of the poem being used as a subversive catalyst by potential readers, they are thinking of a clear social authorization for their work, but not one that can be codified or regulated.
There is a clear difference here between a practice that
sees a social dimension for poetry, embedded in its artifice, and a
poetry that has as its chief dimension mimesis of a recognizable social
world. In the first case the reader has to dialogue with the text; in the
second the social is encoded in the empirical lyricism of the paraphrasable
content, yet such writing runs the risk of becoming monologic, however
accessible (a favoured term of approbation for the orthodoxy).
The
implication of the former case is that no poem is more ‘social’ than any other
since all poems are social facts open to social comprehension (or even
completion in the case of open works). Indeed all utterances are social,
in this sense. The accessibility of an utterance is not a determinant of this.
A mathematical formula that will be understood only by three experts is no less
so than a bald news headline broadcast to the nation via various media and
abroad in several languages.
The sociality of all language derives from its essential
dialogic nature, a determining factor of language and literature first noted by
the Bakhtin circle of critics, and explicitly developed as a social
theory in the work of Vološinov, who stated: ‘The utterance is a social
phenomenon.’
The structure of utterance is precisely social and a
description of language, such as Saussure’s, is an abstraction, a dead system.
The individual speech act is likewise a contradiction in terms.
Life begins only at the
point where utterance crosses utterance, i.e.,where verbal interaction begins,
be it not even “face-to-face” verbal interaction, but the mediated, literary
variety.
This crossing emphasises an
essential instability and dynamism not accounted for by synchronic and static
models of language.
There is
no escape from this process of dialogue. ‘A word is a bridge thrown between
myself and another,’ writes Vološinov;
Word is a two-sided
act....As word, it is precisely the product of the reciprocal
relationship between speaker and listener, addesser and addressee.
Even thinking, or inner
speech, is conceived as a dialogue with the world. ‘There is no such thing as
thinking outside orientation toward possible expression’ in the
socio-ideological sphere. 19 Thought itself resembles ‘the
alternating lines of a dialogue’. 20
While this is of the utmost importance, it is in the
extension of these concepts that confirmation of the dialogic nature of
literary practice is found.
But dialogue can also be
understood in a broader sense, meaning not only direct, face-to-face, vocalized
verbal communication between persons, but also verbal communication of any type
whatsoever. A book, i.e., a verbal performance in print, is also an
element of verbal communication.
This formulation also makes
a text an event rather than an object, and one that engenders further social
events.
It is something discussable in actual, real-life
dialogue, but aside from that, it is calculated for active perception,
involving attentive reading and inner responsiveness, and for organized, printed
reaction in the various forms devised by the particular sphere of verbal
communication in question (book reviews, critical surveys, defining influence
on subsequent works and so on.)
That some of the poetry here has not been part
of many such discussions of British poetry points to the timely nature of this
study, and indeed to this book’s function in developing that alternative
poetics. But, more importantly, the calculation of the active perception of a
literary text is evidence of its dialogic intention. The potentiality of
responsive is more important than the actual response which cannot be forced
and cannot be calculated, as Fisher and Harwood realize. But as Bakhtin writes:
‘The living utterance ... cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living
dialogic threads’ in the consciousnesses of actual readers, receptively
positive or hostile. Vološinov states:
Moreover, a verbal performance of this kind also
inevitably orients itself with respect to previous performances in the same
sphere, both those by the same author and those by other authors. It inevitably
takes its point of departure from some particular state of affairs involving a
... literary style. Thus the printed verbal performance engages, as it were, in
ideological colloquy of large scale: it responds to something, objects to
something, affirms something, anticipates possible responses and objections,
seeks support, and so on.
At one
level this shows a part of this poetics approaching a comprehension of the
field of cultural production in a systemized way, akin to that of the theories
of Pierre Bourdieu, and as such is a reminder of the value of the sociological
mapping of poetries in Chapters One and Two, and Five and Six, both of the
orthodoxy and of the discontents. ‘Any utterance...is only a moment in the
continuous process of verbal communication.’
The
insistence that ‘attentive reading’ is necessary reminds us that ‘to understand
another person’s utterance means to orient oneself with respect to it.’ The comprehension of a literary text involves
the kind of engaged reading described by Allen Fisher, as it demands focussed
acts of participation from its readers.
With its
technical resources of openness, indeterminacy and artificiality this poetry
demands social completion:
Any true understanding is dialogic in nature.
Understanding is to utterance as one line of a dialogue is to the next.
Understanding strives to match a speaker’s word with a counter word.
The structures of these
texts work in conformity with dialogic utterance, even if the works are not
well received in the literary world and (this would follow) do not emphasize
social realism and lyrical empiricism. The poetics described here refutes such
comprehension, as a counterword itself, in favour of a comprehension of form in
social terms. The techniques outlined in the previous section lead to the
construction of a text that demands a receptive reading dialogue with its
artifice.
This
social dynamic has been described here in terms of Vološinov’s explicitly
Marxist work, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, but this
insistence upon the dialogic nature of all acts of language is famously present
in the work of his colleague Bakhtin. His work on the polyphonic novel and the
heteroglossic text might be said to be equivalent to the plurovocity Allen
Fisher identifies in his poetics. They both agree that a text itself is a dialogue
in which discourses clash and contest, even beyond the intentionality of its
author, although Fisher favours techniques of creative linkage to achieve this.
However,
at this point of the argument, it is interesting to note the more philosophical
and ethical re-formulation of dialogue in Bakhtin’s work. Language ‘directed
towards its object’, by which Bakhtin means towards its theme,
enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled
environment of alien words, value judgements and accents, weaves in and out of
complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects
with yet a third group; and all this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a
trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate the expression and influence
its entire stylistic profile.
Not only is the alien word
(an invasion of new or unusual material, which will steer language change)
waiting there; the encounter with the counter word is anticipated. ‘Every word
is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of
the answering word that it anticipates.’
Linguistic exchange (and that must include performances in print) is a
question of answerability, an encounter with an other, and one in which
response entails responsibility. Hwa Yol Jung has identified ‘an affinity
between the structural requirement of ‘answerability’ (‘response-ability’) in
Bakhtin’s dialogical principle and Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of proximity,
which privileges the face and epitomizes human co-presence and interhuman presence
in terms of the structural primacy of the other.’
The third level of analysis, the ethical, may be read about here.
The third level of analysis, the ethical, may be read about here.